

C-II DOCS

[Note: ~~any~~ costs of ~~the~~ lying Pres to make wrong statement: 1) destroys his credibility; he was either (compared to lying) ~~not~~ ignorant of facts

d) foolish in inference (or at least, wrong)

e) lying as to evidence

2) This leaves his ability to persuade later.

3) Puts him in position of saying warning which is the definal.

(Without worrying about this — upsetting Pres promptly of his error.)

Note that main purpose of Sept 4 statement was to

to US public

say that there was no present evidence of the list

to have

of items; warning option was secondary. [was it

considered awkward to apply the warning "grant issues,"

to less than the whole list of items about which

the US public was being misled — in face of charges —

as to their absence?)]

Feb 18: Laws met and main strategy they would
move several thousand men before the
middle of March — in interests of defense.

Feb 25

question of migration; photos of ships.

We wanted numbers of troops, to make public; in
mutual interest to convince public.

March 7, 63

Dob - Thompson; Ambassadors. Dob wanted that
it was too bad that the opposition to the Admin
continued to make so much noise about Cuba
as this had the effect of restricting what the Gov
Gov could do about it.

26 April 1967

K, Goughs; Hamman, Mike Farnstead Kohler,
Sullivan

Gov H. raised the Pres concern with Cuba. K
answered with some heat, "What can
Cuba do with her 7 millions? You have laid a
dozen Cubes around us, Turkey, Greece, Iran,
Norway, Germany, Italy, UK, Pakistan & Japan"
— to which Goughs added South Korea.

H. said we had no substantial troops in any of
the countries mentioned, except Germany & Japan. The Pres
is concerned about Sov troops in Cuba and had expected
K would make a significant reduction in Sov forces on
the basis of their understanding.

K claimed they have removed 3 to 5 times the
number of troops reported in the American press, but
that he would not disclose the exact numbers "because if
I do that you will boast that you have squeezed me

conversions from the Russians. Anyway, this is a question for us and the Cubans."

H. said that we had reported the removal of about 4000 Sov troops from Cuba since the end of the year; I think that number was 20,000 and since the Sovs presumably [?] had only 17,000 in Cuba at that time this left us with a figure of -3000 which was apparently some sort of special Russian arithmetic.

K replied he would have to have a special report prepared to show exactly what numbers were involved, and then wait time for the Sov. [A]

H. said the Pres would not want to use erroneous figures in confronting his domestic opposition and it would be very helpful to him if he could have some more accurate figures. K, somewhat excited, replied that this rather affects the sovereignty and pride of the SU... the SU is not accountable to the US and cannot appear before

the world as constantly conceding to American pressures. While he did not want to complicate life for the Press and world in principle be ready to furnish info to the Press, the latter's critics would only say this proved the need for more pressure of on the SU because only pressure produced results, and that would make the situation worse. [What pressure? Why not give without pressure, without critics? Note Sov "theory of US politics"] [B]

... H said he hoped K understood this was a very serious subject and that organized military units were more difficult problems than instructors. If these units were removed, policy would be improved. K said if the US wants normal relations with the SU, don't aggravate the issues, don't ask questions which cause tensions for us, don't irritate our national pride. Even with a million Sov troops there, Cuba could not be an invasion springboard. Let the Press deal

with his own problems at home and keep the lid on the Americans. If he doesn't want to do that, let him escalate the matter. We are ready for friendship, but are prepared to deal with the other alternative. Neither of us wants to start anything over Cuba, but if anything is started, the Soviets have military strength.

It said Cuba is creating much tension in the whole Caribbean area and if it is not important to the Soviets to have troops in there why don't they take them out, and leave only instructors.

K repeated sharply that that was the business of the Soviets and the Cubans. It is a question of sovereignty. He asked about the Polish and American bases in the UK, France, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, all directed against the USSR. Still we want them to report to the US on the troops.

[A: I said that because the troops were in Cuba.
Pres Kennedy ~~to~~ was having a great deal of
difficulty keeping the country quiet on the Cuba issue.
If Mr. K could either correct the Pres' understanding
about the number of troops that had been
withdrawn, ~~or withdraw~~ ~~the~~ more, he was sure the
Pres would cooperate in avoiding any embarrassment for
the Sows.

K replied this had become a very complicated
[for him?]
and difficult question partly because there was so
much clamor in the U.S. There is nothing the Sows can
do to satisfy those who are the chief critics of the
Pres on this issue. The Pres must take care of the brief-

B: K could state that the Sov military personnel were
there only temporarily, taking the Cubans to use the
equipment they had received from the SO, after which
they would return.

H asked why the Sows could not remove all

their organized military ^{troops} units, leaving only the instructors behind. [Why not? To keep Cubans from firing?!] K replied this was a matter for the Soviets & the Cubans, and they were not accountable to anyone else.

[July 26, 1963: Harrold - Khrushchev]

H asked whether K would be willing ~~to~~ let him inform Press re number of instructors in Cuba. Recalled K had told him Cuban chieftain was not to thin thing.

K said chieftain was indeed difficult. As to number of instructors, that was sovereign question. Because if he were to give that number to H. that would in effect be be mean be accounting to H. This was a matter between USSR and Cuba.

R reported that "we really have withdrawn a lot of troops" and "we have not replaced any... we have withdrawn...."

He understood the Pres' difficulties and believed the Pres has a very sound understanding of the situation.

May 18, 63

Dale - Rusk

R asked about 4 Saw battalions combat troops and he said he was not speaking on instructions but that it was his information that these units had "almost entirely" gone home. He said there had been an argument in the Kremlin about whether to furnish us exact information about the Saw military personnel but that some had "gotten angry" and they had decided not to do so.

[What was this all about? What does it say about internal pressures, concern with face?]

~ Berlin:

K: the socialist countries have gained more in Berlin from the wall than they would have gained from a peace treaty, which would have provided that no wall could be built. "Berlin is no longer a source of trouble."

May 11, 1963

Dale - Rusk, Thompson

Sec said that we did not intend to give nuclear weapons to anyone not now possessing them, and that the arrangements which we envisaged ^[MCF] would not allow any one nuclear power to be in a position to fire such weapons. ---

Dale asked if we wanted the Chinese to be a member of a multilateral force.

Sec said that if it were on the same basis as we had in mind, we would be quite relaxed about it.

Aug 9, 63 Moscow

Pink, Thompson, Koller, Davis, Akalovsky

K, Gromyko, Dob.

... K continued the West had corns in the GDR. Why should be removed so that there would be no temptation to step on them. It was Walter Lippman who had invented this expression, and it was a wise expression. So, a peace treaty should be signed.

Sec. observed this was one of the problems. These corns were simply given the geography of the situation. However, it ~~was~~ important to resist such temptation for it would be hard for us to apologize [?] if our corns were under someone's foot.

K interjected that he who stepped on corns apologized but then stepped again grinding his heel. The Sec observed this was not very polite. K asked whether it was polite not to sign a peace treaty and to leave corns in foreign territory.

WH-Bundy

See

26 Nov 63

Pres, Harriman, Midoyan, Dobryin

Comm between Pres + K

(Thompson copy)

Dabryni - Herman Feb 26, 1964

He brought up the arms limitation discussions and ^{whether} asked me ~~if~~ I agreed this was a bad year to attempt to reach some agreement.

I told him definitely I did not agree. Pres. Johnson was anxious to make progress. Although certain types of agreement might be difficult to reach with in an election year, I felt that other understandings could be achieved.

Dalrymple - Rust, May 18, 1963

R. asked D. what would be the principal question asked him when he reaches Moscow.

D. said the overriding question was whether it ~~was~~ is possible to reach any agreement with the US on any subject. He said there was a dispute on this point going on among the leadership in Moscow and that they were then in the middle of a reappraisal. He thought it of great importance that some point be found on which agreement could be reached. He emphasized the psychology of an agreement or something rather than the importance of the subject of the agreement itself.

R - that been.

I added that
Berlin: I thought an earlier remark of mine to Mr. George two years earlier had proved to be well founded, namely, that now this could serve to reduce tensions in Central Europe and that friction surrounding the Berlin question could become more manageable. I pointed to the easing of pressures

on East Germany after the Wall...

I emphasized very strongly the psychological importance of a NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-Aggression Agreement. He said it ~~was~~ did not mean very much in practice but that it could do no harm and that it would be important for those in the SU who were supporting the view that some sort of agreement with the West is possible....

... I told him there was considerable skepticism about a pact that might seem as empty as the Kellogg-Briand Pact proved to be and that there were some in the West who felt that if we entered into such an agreement and this were followed by a severe Berlin crisis, that we should all look like fools. He said, & I thought with some significance, that such a pact would make such a crisis far less likely.

D. said he would be closely questioned about how he saw the forthcoming Presidential campaign in the US and the basis upon which Pres. Kennedy would conduct the campaign on matters affecting the SU.

D. on argument over telling US on troop reductions (see)

Interpersonal with the above were occasional comments by DeLorain about the difficulties "they" have in Moscow in understanding how things can happen in our society without the specific approval and support of Pres Kennedy. He referred to such things as speeches by leading Senators, bits of the most confidential exchanges between the two governments, and the general problem of the constitutional limitations on an American President. D. mentioned these as part of his problem (ital.)

in explaining the US to his own people because he
himself and, he added, Mr. Goughs have a better
understanding of how our system works. He
underlined, however, the importance of preventing leaks
and noted, for example, that the famous "Saturday
Evening Post" article contained specific phrases from
a most confidential communication ^{taken} ~~by~~ of the
Chairman himself. I told him the Pres. was most
anxious to preserve the confidential character of
exchanges between himself and Mr. L, and that we have
taken the most strenuous measures from time to time
to insure against leaks or to discover how an occasional
leak in fact came about.

[Note implications of low interpretation of US
behavior on assumption that US Gov is
monolithic ("revealed preference" of the Pres
in every action; with assumption of stable, coherent,
connected preferences.)

Also, assumption of Pres ability to prevent leaks;
know, (to evade a public commitment by keeping
a secret?)

[This hyp about Cuba depends on assumption that
they thought it likely or certain that US would see
missiles prior to election.]

(If not, why not?)

[Exchange of info on past decision-making]

D. raised at his initiative an attitude toward a
CA member from your and seemed quite
interested when I told him that we had encouraged
the Brazilian initiative last year.

D. told me that one of the problems which regularly irritates our relations is the people in Moscow that that US methods in dealing with particular issues leave the impression that we do not take into sufficient account the SU's prestige as a great power.

... He said he felt the general proposition was understood on both sides but that in details (and he made a general allusion to Cuba) he thought we sometimes overlooked questions of their prestige.

[Study: role of prestige in
Great-power relations;
relation ~~to~~ personal / Admin prestige
(including de Gaulle phenomenon: identification with
country) (relation ~~made~~ in democracy).]

"Why can't he do that to me," "Attack on the Administration &
the US Gov."

July 28, 1963 Haring, Kohler, Kayser, Adelsky
K, Delvingin, thoughts

K:

... If US continued to prevent Gheras from signing a
peace treaty he quite sure there would be another Rapallo.
Did not know how many years this would take, perhaps 5
or 10, but this was only way out for Gheras.

... H ~~continued~~... expressed hope that what K said meant
he was ready to tear down Berlin Wall.

K said could assure H wall would not be removed
even when Peace Treaty signed. Wall could be torn down
only under United Socialist Germany established.

H remarked this long time off.

K said did not know and was not saying when this would
happen, but what he was saying was present situation

would remain until then. Sows felt fine, even very fine, with Wall. They felt cozy and more tranquil.
Therefore, Sows in no hurry.

Wall played very important role and he was furiously
with himself not to have thought of it earlier.

H/o recalled K had said to him Lippman was right
re Wall.

K replied Lippman was right, but it had not been
Lippman who had recommended establishment of Wall
to Sows. In reply to H's question he said from time to
time Sows would step on President's foot so he could
realize he should cut out his corns.

H said he did not

(^{less for} corros: civil air comm. with Berlin; low tariff privileges;

GDR cables for talk tel; West German reparations.

(Huang.)

K observed as soon as discussion turned to this problem relations between us too cooled off, and this was additional ~~reasons~~ proof this boil must be done away with. Wondered why the hell US or USSR needed it, Jews certainly did not.

∴ H said he understood K had said to Spaak he would take off his hat and bow apologizing after he stepped on curbs.

K laughed and said, yes, that was why it was done sometimes. One stepped on someone's foot accidentally, apologized, but then ground his heel a bit.

H commented as long as K said it with a smile he was not taking it seriously.

A social free 10 speech (American University: see / was
best statement made by any President since Roosevelt.

[See Note: April 27, 1964 memo, aside memo from
Dale to Rusk on Cuban overflights]

Elections

Statement of Deb for ^{Thompson} ~~April~~ April 27, 1964
on Cuban overflights

D. We would like to be understood correctly; if the flights go on and a new conflict arises, it may bring head-on not only the US and Cuba, but also the US and the SU.

It is taken into account in Moscow that all this problem has its complicated aspects for the US now, for the Pres, especially during the pre-election campaign. But if the policy of one or ~~the~~ other country on major international questions directly related to the maintenance of world peace and security is to be ~~maintained~~ subordinated exclusively to the election considerations, then it may lead to such complications which anyone hardly may wish, at least people who realize their responsibility for the destiny of their countries, for the destiny of the world.

... while elections always spawned issues,
this was not really the problem. I said that we had
been able to quiet down the extremes of opinion in this
country on the basis that we were in a position to assure
our people that there was no real military threat to this
country from Cuba. I said it was important we continue to
be able to do this.

Do issue appeared to have been raised by our note to
the Cubans. ~~He~~ [April 20, 65] [see]. He said
this action was not understood ⁱⁿ Moscow. Our relations
were developing favorably on the grounds of mutual trust,
and our (insistence) on continued overflights appeared to
be saying that we did not trust the Soviets and were
indicating that we thought they would take actions to
threaten us.

China: description by thought; again

... surviving of this affair was
I hoped it could now be taken out of
... domain. I said I was over one objection
... to avoid misunderstanding.

I said it's quite possible that Cubes would raise
this matter in the UN and be made clear that Sars
would have no alternative but to give them full support
since violation of sovereignty was something no one could
condone.

↳ Who did start it?

Is it possible that effect on Moscow was like
the statement in 1960 implying US right to occupy and
intent to continue? (I thought, differences).

Then, Sars reply to our public position, not to the flight?
(as distinct from Castro's position)

statements about not shooting before elections
mean:

1) face-saving device for dropping issue for now,
without deadline for renewing; having failed to make
headway.

2) Serious intent to press issue after elections,
having decided not worthwhile, or too risky, before
elections; perhaps convinced with hope to win points
for the "favor." (but putting on notice that above
current failure to shoot doesn't mean acceptance)

3) Deadline for US backdown: e.g. right after
election, before Cuban pressure fully renewed.

(All these seem w.r.t. Berlin promise/threat in 1962.

But then:

4) Some other provocative process, "maturing" around
election; ~~which~~ they wish to deter reaction prior to election, by
threatening retaliation over Cuba if we respond, while
promising this will not occur otherwise. J

...over [if despite arms agreements, and observation of
...agreements for $1\frac{1}{2}$ years] if it is now stated by the
American side that the flights of US military planes
over Cuba are being carried on because of alleged
necessity to ascertain again and again that the
other side fulfills its commitments ensuing from the
arrangement on the settlement of the Caribbean crisis; then
we wish to ~~state~~ express our attitude to this with
all straightforwardness and without any unnecessary
diplomacy: it offends us.

...
[However, there is a status quo over Cuban airspace;
excepted by SU previously, and public (though quiet):
unlike U-2 1956-60. However, Castro control is now
elegant. But why did Soviet hand over control?]

of American military planes into the
of Cuba are continued and if attention is not
on the part of the USG to the warnings that this
is a violation of the sovereignty of Cuba, the Cuba will
be forced to take measures and will start shooting
down these planes. And if the US threaten Cuba and
assert the right to punish Cuba for enjoying its
sovereignty and defending its air space, and if they even
go so far as ~~to~~ saying that it is namely the SC which
allegedly bears responsibility for the consequences of Cubans
defending their sovereignty, then we must plainly tell you:
yes, indeed, if there is an invasion of Cuba, the SC
will bear the responsibility, but the responsibility to fulfill
its obligations in providing assistance to Cuba for repelling
the invasion. We have made such a statement publicly.
You must understand what it will lead to — it
will lead to spreading a war unleashed by the US against
Cuba onto the territories of the US & the SC.

desire for a "new conflict," but if this
conflict would arise unless we changed
practice we had been following ever since the
Cuban crisis, then the situation was very serious indeed.

[As an issue now: loss of face that would follow if
our justification for occupying no-impetration were
lost?]

[Castro had celebrated the Bay of Pigs invasion!

D. claimed US had generated attention on Cuba.

Reid to DeB, April 22: Castro had an opportunity to live
in peace with his neighbors but was not interested and the
US wants no further crisis over "this unwanted little man"
and ^{he} threatened the USSR felt the same way.]

and only we could not use slant photographs
idea. He argued that the U-2 photographs he had
seen from the plane that was shot down in 1960
covered long distances both ways in considerable detail.
I pointed out that complete photo coverage was
impossible on account of the terrain, and that it was as
much in Saw's interest as well as our own that Ones be
able to refute constant stories that Sovs were putting
missiles into Cuba.

[1) Was this same argument that Clint used in 1962 to
justify flights to Pres, McN, Bush?

2) Does K believe what Deb says; (note, D. had some
photos); if so, did they assume that peripheral flights in
Oct ~~Sept~~ had probably seen missiles? (Sept 17 on flight...)
(No? peripheral not in Sept?)]

62

Pres, Sec, Thompson

Michigan, Delo.

beginning in July the Soviets sent over 100 ships loaded with arms and military material to Cuba. While this was going on, the Pres, trusting official statements by the SU, continued to affirm that there was no danger to the US from an arms buildup in Cuba. This had led to very serious political difficulties on all levels. It is difficult ^{for the Pres} to say at the present moment that the situation in Cuba is in any way satisfactory, since it is not known what will happen next month or what the Chinese will do. Maybe the Chinese Communists will start an arms buildup in Cuba in January, or maybe the SU itself will start such a buildup ^{again}. After all, what the Soviets did once they could do again and no one could blame ~~the~~ a certain feeling of mistrust on the part of the US after what had happened.

decision to inform the United States
elections: never, informing the President or Press.
First, it was intended to communicate with the US
Gov on a confidential basis, and then to make an announcement
to the press. ... As for the purpose of the military
build-up, it was obviously not offensive [all SU had
said, in public: check Sept 11 statement] The decision had
been made to inform the United States after the elections so as
to avoid influencing in any way the political campaign in the
US. The Press itself certainly would not want to have
the elections influenced by Soviet moves. [i.e. disclosure
of Sov moves.] Of course on the 22nd of Oct. no
intimation of the build-up was made by the SU but even if
[not: even if Press didn't know]
a disclosure had not taken place the SU had would
have brought the entire build-up to the attention of the US on
Nov 8th or 10th, immediately after the elections.

... that concerns him is that every six months it
another crisis seems to arise. How can the
world go through the next decade under such
circumstances? H: Step-by-step negotiations will be necessary.

warren Post.

The next question may be a NAP between NATO and

Pres said it is strange that there are these
countries such as the SU and the US which are powerful
and wealthy; and which have no direct conflicts of
interest to separate them. In spite of that, they find
themselves perpetually in a state bordering on conflict.

at the same time many other parts of the world are facing
problems of hunger and underdevelopment. It would be good if
the SU were to devote its ~~interests~~ efforts to the pursuit of
its own interests, in the same way in which the US
devotes its own efforts to the pursuit of its own interests,
and abandon the belief that it is its job to kindle
revolutionary fires all over the world. This would be worth
more than 40 non-aggression treaties.

regardless of

SC or the US do.

said that this may be true, but it was still
for the two countries to understand each other
better. How could the SC believe that the US would
not react on finding that there were 40 missiles
placed in Cuba?

[Note: some people say: a) it was

and: why didn't ONE/
US know? why

obviously inevitable for Khrushchev to react in

didn't these people

Cuba; he had to

predict whole
crisis?

b) it was reasonable for K to think he would

not, given his earlier behavior.

If Cuba was "obviously different," why did

K not notice this?

'How would the Soviets have reacted if the US had
placed 40 missiles in Finland, especially if the
gov of that country had been as inimical to the SC as
Castro is to the US?

... and US missiles in Turkey very close to
... In spite of that he feels that Sov
... may sleep with Triguillit, as long as the
missiles in question are in American hands. This is
because he trusts Pres. Kennedy.

The Pres said that he has always been of the
opinion that American missile bases such as those
in Turkey do not make sense. Several have been
deactivated and for the last twenty months the US Gov
has worked at deactivating more. That is why the
exploring of Sov missiles in Cuba has come as such a
shock.

Ha
[My statement suggests strongly no "deal". But ^{possibly}
that X said about same as above to Y on Oct 27 —
and it was either: a) ^{RFK?} not influential, in light of ^{DeLo?} Shostakovich, or
b) used by K only to bricks (but M would have been one).
? Or: K's 27 Oct offer showed up our initiative,
just long enough. Thus, if Lippman was influential . . .

... sweep
...? Would we not have,
... evening?

What if O-2 had not been shot — what would
we have done Saturday: a) With K letter of 27th
b) without " " " " ?

In each case: How would we have acted
on 27-29 Oct — without K backdown on
morning of 28th?]

[Was Lippman offer bad — given that it evoked
SC demand?

Paradox like! effect of: Keating

McCona (vs. intell comm)

O-2 incidents, delays

Admin

JFK predictions, warnings

It is clear that neither governments have
admitted one another. This is a type of
disrespect which neither they nor the world
can afford.

M said he liked the spirit of what the
Pres had just said. That is why it is necessary
to talk problems over and to agree.

Pres said it was not enough to obtain
verbal agreements. They also must be implemented. It would
be better perhaps if — as in the case of Russia — the SC
would not always insist that it is fulfilling its obligations.

It would be better if it were ready to admit its
shortcomings, as the US is ready to admit its own shortcomings,
and work harder to correct them. [Vienna]

M said that problems had to be taken up one by one.

Pres said that in doing so it must be remembered
that the two countries have very few genuinely divergent
interests, and yet there are many conflicts between them. There
is something very wrong with such a situation.

...K attributes ...
... for US misjudgment — and SO's?)]

What do ExComm members think the crucial
miscalculations of Laos were?

Note what we don't yet know about their calculations.

In general: if US actions were "obvious, inevitable,"
why weren't they so to opponents, allies? Observers?
What specific mistakes were made? ^{and why weren't these foreseen} (e.g. as possibilities) or noticed?

(Probably: what can be seen in retrospect, and could
have been seen earlier, were pressures on Pres to respond,
and "reasons/logical considerations" for doing so. But:
were not these pressures & reasons estimated to be insufficient
beforehand? Why? Were these estimates bad? Were they
wrong? — i.e. were these particular pressures, reasons ~~more~~
salient to decision-makers, or otherwise critically influential;
were they sufficient, or necessary?

Saltzman/Porter: list the reasons/pressures/interests known, +

assume / infer that they were sufficient.

[But: 2) may have been others

b) must also explain disincentives, explain why these were overestimated by observers earlier, & why they were inadequate to restrain.

i.e. to explain action, not enough to show there were some positive incentives. Must show why they outweighed disincentives.]

Claim on secrecy practice: no one knows how many others are talking.

1962

Oct 28, 12:25 AM for Darling from Pres (A. Johnson)

(Deliver soonest to Adman) -

I am sending Arb. Darling to make sure you are fully informed of the current situation in Cuba. The situation is clearly growing more ~~intense~~ tense and if satisfactory responses are not received from the other side in the next forty-eight hours, the situation is likely to enter a progressively intense military phase.

We are trying to make our determination just as clear as our machines for a proper settlement. It gives me great courage in these days to know that we have your support, as expressed in your letter.

see Nov 19 letter to Adm. .

+ Nov 21 " " .

Oct 23, 1962 wed. 4:03 PM for Adnan

Dear Mr. Pres:

Your Amb, Mr. Darling, & others gathering gave me your letter and your radio address and showed me the overwhelming evidence. I appreciate very much your arranging to have me informed so promptly. I fully share your views. What is happening in Cuba is the most serious threat that has ever been made against the H. Free World by the SU. The right, for speedy action which you, Mr. Pres, have initiated, is necessary, and we welcome it out of deep conviction.

We must wait and see whether there will be repercussions in Berlin and Germany. I am thankful for the concern you feel about our own difficulties, in particular in Berlin. There are, to be sure, just the effects of the malevolence of the SU, and if it succeeds in Cuba, its demands in other parts of the world will only increase.

It is a great pity that the Cuban people, the
majority of whom, I am certain, think differently, should
expose their own country to annihilation just to further the
aspirations of the SC.

~

April 20, 1961:

letter from Adnan, just after leaving US;

... of trust that developments in Cuba will proceed
in a direction desired by all of us. . . .

Accompanying message from ^{Adnan} Ambar:

1. The Adnan Kassar is extremely anxious about the
situation in Cuba. It regards any blow to American
prestige as of concern to Kassar; and it is concerned with
any strengthening of Castro's position.

Oct 5 1961 Ackman to Pros:

... The SU will in substance remain what it is, even if now
a certain ~~state~~ degree of understanding will be reached.

Already in the centuries of the Gars, at least since Peter
the Great, Russia was aggressive and always intent on
an expansion in its vicinity, especially towards the West...

Communism has not smothered Russian nationalism,
it has strengthened it. Mr. & Too, in my opinion, is
firstly a Russian nationalist and only secondly a
Communist.

See letters of Aug 16, Braunt-JFK

Aug 29 Ackm. - JFK

(Wall-like ^{kind of} ~~big~~ ^{big} nationalism;
Stalin - like ~~Stalin~~ - a crisis for Ally, not for US

[Class of crises: in which an ally creates a crisis
for an ally; or, an ally has a crisis which another
ally doesn't share, initially; but, crisis response creates
crisis for other. Skybolt. Well? Long Arrow
signature.

Oct 28, 1962

from OSUN: SYG asked US ^{without announcement} ~~mean~~ suspended, during his visit, to avoid embarrassment ^{to him} of an incident during his visit.

... SYG expressed grave concern at call-up yesterday ~~Oct 28~~ of AF reserves, and without explicitly saying so, left impression he thought some of US actions had been excessive.

RUSK: Background press + radio news briefing, 28 Oct,
1:04 p.m.

Off the record: there is may a split between the exp + the SF.

You remember we had — well, you don't remember, but it hasn't been made public yet, but on Oct 26 we had a message from K that pointed in the same direction as the message broadcast today. Then overnight there was a public broadcast, you remember, that injected Turkey into this situation. Now today we had had another

public broadcast of a message, which seems to in effect open up the same prospect for a settlement that was contained in the Oct 26 message. . . . But obviously people in the Kremlin have been very much concerned about what their course of conduct was going to be.

. . . I do think that the press has a special problem here in the next day or two in terms of not throwing this thing off the track as far as Moscow is concerned. If there is a debate, a rivalry, a contest going on in the Kremlin over how to play this situation, we don't want the word "capitulation" or we don't want gloating at the moment ~~wait~~ for the next couple of days to strengthen the hands of those in Moscow who wanted to play this another way.

Now, this is a problem that we have and therefore it's a problem of that you share with us. Because there

has undoubtedly been a serious debate in the Kremlin
over what to do about it. I mentioned in my last
backgrounder with you that this apparently had caught
them somewhat off timing as it had come earlier than
they expected [signs?], than they wanted. So...
I want to caution you about the move, because this can
make a difference in what Moscow does.

[Issue: Was 22-28 Oct a
decision crisis — involving plans, etc.
— for Moscow? Or simply,
carrying out contingency plan C?

[i.e. was "problem" only one of recognition, perception,
of situation/timing, ~~as~~ as to determine when to carry
out an action that had been pre-matched to
situation. I.e., had a decision rule, linking action to
situation, or even, to incoming signals, been specified?

Might still have some characteristics of crisis if

- a) situation/signals ambiguous, subject to conflicting interpretations;
- b) Short time available for "identification,"
- c) Consequences of wrong identification are very grave.

[Cf: 1) the decision problem of a tympsonist, or the man with the eyeballs.

2) decision problem of a man crossing a high wire over Niagara Falls.]

(Then c, + b, nearly every identification is subject to some doubt and controversy.

Still, focus is on: "What is it? What's happening?" rather than "What do we do — given, or if, this is the situation?"

Deep background (28 Oct:) no attribution to official source.

What we have said to the SC in response to their Oct 26 letter ~~is~~ is a secret has been public. In other words, there are no deals.

Q: ... Russ: I hope that maybe the other side or Mr. U Thant or somebody will make this Oct 26 letter public. We don't feel that we can because it was a private letter and we don't want ourselves to take the initiative in making such a letter public unless the other side itself wants to.

[Note refs to it in JFK Oct 27 public letters

K's complaints about refs to it in Alsop-Bathurst article]

Q: Have you formed a conclusion yet, Mr. Sec. on why the Turkey statement followed the private letter?

A. I think that came about because of Walter Lippman's column and Mr. Keisky's public speech in Austria.³

[Why be angry at this, given that K abandoned it?]]

R: The occasion for an invasion was for as we were concerned was the introduction of offensive missiles into Cuba. Offensive weapons, not just missiles.

Q: going back to the first question that was asked regarding what does K get out of this...

R: Well, put yourself in his position rather than your own and try to see what he gets out of it.

The first thing he gets out of it, he doesn't have a war, and that's a good deal.

[my answer to
Nick Katzybach]

Q: But publicly what does he have to show his —

R: Well I think quite frankly — I think we ought to go along with his thesis that he's exchanging these missiles for a commitment not to invade Cuba. ... In other words, if he's willing to trade on that, let's let him have that, if that's what he needs at this point.

R: ... I think there are differences of view in the Politburo. And I mean I still don't know, frankly, why the difference between the Oct. 26 letter and the broadcast.

I must say I have speculated a little bit about whether this is related to the circumstances in which they at the Geneva disarm. conf. agreed on Friday to a declaration on war propaganda and on Tuesday completely reversed their position.

In other words, I think in this collegiate method of collegiate command that they have that there are

undoubtedly differences of view just as we have seen.

[Views of "incongruity" of letters:

- 1) Conflict in Kremlin.
- 2) Unified command — K, or committee — but
response to : a) new info

b) reflection, doubts

- 3) Deliberate, planned signature : ^{private} Fomin — Oct 26 — ^{public} Oct 27

intensity as in negotiations and delaying action, thus
raising the price.

(see 14R, C/A analyses)

Committee decision-making: how does it differ from
"coherent" decision-making?

Choice/conclusion can shift in response to
internal/external events other than analysis of evidence
or receipt of "evidence" whose impact on conclusions can be
specified in terms of Bayes Theorem. Changes in internal
power balance, authority, influence on group decision/opinion;
e.g. McComb's honeycomb; an election, dismissal; ^{pressure events} diversity authority.

Brandt - JFK, Oct 29, 1962

I should like to congratulate you. Your decisions have made clear to the SU how seriously word of OS must be taken. I believe this will have useful effects world-wide.

[Why did K get out? What did he conclude, later, that content of Oct 27 warning had been? Did he believe it, later?]

Thompson on letters (Ambassadorial Group, Oct 29)

1. First letter possibly written by K without authority of President. No real evidence for this, although style of first letter suggests K authorship.
2. Saw my own thought after first letter that they recognized hints of a Turkey-Cuba deal in Lippman column and speech of Austrian Foreign Minister, so they attempted raise price.
3. Second letter possibly designed to put pressure on US to accept first offer by showing that price could go higher.

T: If K has lost he will be less likely to take a tough line on Berlin, although by the same token he will also be in no position to make concessions on Berlin. [?]

[What if we were tough, having first demonstrated our toughness?] Therefore, we do not wish to draw attention to Berlin at the moment.

T and Ritz stressed US belief we would probably be on
verge full-scale nuclear war if it were
established that Sars were not dismantling weapons.

[Investigate Oct 30-Nov 1 crisis]

Accidents:

U-2 shot between 10:15 and 11:00 AM Eastern daylight
2 low alt planes shot at by small arms and
light AA about 4 PM; undamaged.

Letter to K, 8:05 PM, 27 Oct

Oct 26 letter
[Publishing ~~this~~ would reveal that our "interpretation"
of it in Oct 27 statement was unsupported! Raise
questions.]

12/5/62 Friday - Ball

I thought when this [Bentley-Alsop: Arthur] blows over I would rewrite a new version of this based on the info my head would be, "Now it can be told. Here is a hitherto untold story of the role of five warmongers, who in disagreement with the President wanted to invade and air strike, and so on." You think that has some possibility?

Ball: I think it has a very interesting possibility. You know the fascinating thing was that this story built it up as though the real heroes were the guys who were ^{just} plain off base.

F: Who were wrong.

B: That's right. And when history has shown that what they were proposing was not the thing to do.

— I "⁵lands" - McG, D, T, McG, Arthur?]

Sadler to Ball: Pres. For Christ sake, what advantage would there be to have him go. ... it would be a disaster.

B: we had a solemn commitment among us taken with
the Pres that nobody was going to disclose that.

(Saturday in Oval Room: no one would disclose
views of anybody, or his own.)

Stew: ... the letter I wrote to K on Wednesday: "Please understand
Mr. Chairman that we are prepared to discuss the
issues in the context of the general disarm. treaty.
This we have been committed to for 4 years."

I did feel it very important we use the peace keeping
machinery that existed in the OAS + the UN.

(Change Alcoa-B left off B, RG, + VP off ExCom
deliberately: purge Stew.) i.e. list of as blockade

"doers": RFK, McN, Lovett, Thompson. Presumably, B, VP, RG

and Ritz also doers. (R?) Made Stew. seem alone on

Oct. 20. Alcoa left out Martin, Johnson, Ritz